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Abstract
Security is a critical concern around the world. In many domains from cybersecurity to sustainabil-
ity, limited security resources prevent complete security coverage at all times. Instead, these
limited resources must be scheduled (or allocated or deployed), while simultaneously taking into
account the importance of different targets, the responses of the adversaries to the security pos-
ture, and the potential uncertainties in adversary payoffs and observations, etc. Computational
game theory can help generate such security schedules. Indeed, casting the problem as a
Stackelberg game, we have developed new algorithms that are now deployed over multiple years
in multiple applications for scheduling of security resources. These applications are leading to real-
world use-inspired research in the emerging research area of “security games.” The research chal-
lenges posed by these applications include scaling up security games to real-world-sized problems,
handling multiple types of uncertainty, and dealing with bounded rationality of human adversaries.
In cybersecurity domain, the interaction between the defender and adversary is quite complicated
with high degree of incomplete information and uncertainty. While solutions have been proposed
for parts of the problem space in cybersecurity, the need of the hour is a comprehensive under-
standing of the whole space including the interaction with the adversary. We highlight the innov-
ations in security games that could be used to tackle the game problem in cybersecurity.
Key words: game theory; security; limited resources.
Introduction
Security is a critical concern around the world that manifests in
problems such as protecting our cyber infrastructure from attacks
by criminals and other nation-states; protecting our ports, airports,
public transportation, and other critical national infrastructure from
terrorists; protecting our wildlife and forests from poachers and
smugglers; and curtailing the illegal flow of weapons, drugs, and
money across international borders. In all of these problems, there
are limited security resources which prevents security coverage of all
the targets at all times; instead, security resources must be deployed
intelligently taking into account differences in the importance of tar-
gets, the responses of the attackers to the security posture, and po-
tential uncertainty over the types, capabilities, knowledge, and
priorities of attackers faced.
Game theory, which models interactions among multiple self-
interested agents, is well-suited to the adversarial reasoning required
for the security resource allocation and scheduling problem. Casting
the physical problem as a Stackelberg game, we have developed new
algorithms for efficiently solving such games that provide random-
ized patrolling or inspection strategies. These algorithms have led to
successes and advances over previous human-designed approaches
in security scheduling and allocation by addressing the key weakness
of predictability in human-designed schedules. These algorithms are
now deployed in multiple applications. The first application was
ARMOR (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes), which
was deployed at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in
2007 to randomize checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport
and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals [1]. Following
that, came several other applications: IRIS (Intelligent Randomiza-
tion In Scheduling), a game-theoretic scheduler for randomized
deployment of the US Federal Air Marshals, has been in use since
2009 [1]; PROTECT, which schedules the US Coast Guard’s (USCG)
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randomized patrolling of ports, has been deployed in the port of
Boston since April 2011 and is in use at the port of New York since
February 2012 [2] and has spread to other ports such as Los An-
geles/Long Beach, Houston, and others; another application for de-
ploying escort boats to protect ferries has been deployed by the
USCG since April 2013 [3]; and TRUSTS (Tactical Randomization for
Urban Security in Transit Systems) [4], which has been evaluated in
field trials by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) in the
LA Metro system. Most recently, PAWS—another game-theoretic ap-
plication was tested by rangers in Uganda for protecting wildlife in
Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP) in April 2014 [5]; MIDAS
was tested by the USCG for protecting fisheries [6]. These initial suc-
cesses point the way to major future applications in a wide range of
security domains. Indeed, researchers have started to explore the use
of security game models in tackling security issues in the cyber
world, such as deep packet inspection [7], optimal use of honey pots
[8], and enforcement of privacy policies [9, 10].
Given the many game-theoretic applications for solving real-
world security problems, this article provides an overview of the
models and algorithms, key research challenges, and a brief descrip-
tion of our successful deployments. We also provide an overview of
applying Stackelberg game-based models to cybersecurity and com-
pare with other existing approaches to model defender–adversary
interaction in cybersecurity. Overall, the work in security games has
produced numerous game-theoretic decision aids that are in daily
use by security agencies to optimize their limited security resources.
The implementation of these applications required addressing fun-
damental research challenges and has led to an emerging “science of
security games” consisting of a general framework for modeling and
solving security resource allocation problems. We categorize the re-
search challenges associated with security games into four broad cat-
egories: (i) addressing scalability across a number of dimensions of
the game, (ii) tackling different forms of uncertainty that be present
in the game, (iii) addressing human adversaries’ bounded rationality,
and (iv) evaluation of the framework in the field. Given the success
in providing solutions for many security domains involving the pro-
tection of critical infrastructure, the science of security games has
evolved and expanded to include new types of security domains for
wildlife and environmental protection. These “green security
games” address important global conservation problems and intro-
duce additional research challenges that require incorporating new
techniques such as planning and learning into security games. The
issues in cybersecurity provide an even richer set of challenges that
include partial observability and deception.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: “Stackelberg
Security Games” section introduces the general security games
model, “Addressing scalability in real-world problems” section de-
scribes the approaches used to tackle scalability issues, “Addressing
uncertainty in real-world problems” section describes the approaches
to deal with uncertainty, “Addressing bounded rationality in real-
world problems” section focuses on bounded rationality,
“Addressing field evaluation in real-world problems” section pro-
vides details of field evaluation of the science of security games and
“Cybersecurity: challenges and opportunities” section describes some
approaches of applying security game models to cybersecurity and
privacy and also other game-theoretic approaches to cybersecurity.
Stackelberg security games
Stackelberg games were first introduced to model leadership and
commitment [11]. The term Stackelberg security games (SSG) was
first introduced by Kiekintveld et al. [12] to describe specializations
of a particular type of Stackelberg game for security as discussed
below. This section provides details on the use of Stackelberg games
for modeling security domains. We first give a generic description of
security domains followed by “security games,” the model by which
security domains are formulated in the Stackelberg game
framework.
SSG Model
In SSG, a defender must perpetually defend a set of targets T using a
limited number of resources, whereas the attacker is able to surveil
and learn the defender’s strategy and attack after careful planning.
An action, or “pure strategy,” for the defender represents deploying
a set of resources R on patrols or checkpoints, e.g., scheduling
checkpoints at the LAX airport or assigning federal air marshals to
protect flight tours. The pure strategy for an attacker represents an
attack at a target, e.g., a flight. The “mixed strategy” of the defender
is a probability distribution over the pure strategies. Additionally,
with each target are also associated a set of payoff values that define
the utilities for both the defender and the attacker in case of a suc-
cessful or a failed attack.
A key assumption of SSG (we will sometimes refer to them as
simply security games) is that the payoff of an outcome depends
only on the target attacked, and whether or not it is “covered” (pro-
tected) by the defender [12]. The payoffs do “not” depend on the re-
maining aspects of the defender allocation. For example, if an
adversary succeeds in attacking target t1, the penalty for the de-
fender is the same whether the defender was guarding target t2 or
not.
This allows us to compactly represent the payoffs of a security
game. Specifically, a set of four payoffs is associated with each tar-
get. These four payoffs are the rewards and penalties to both the de-
fender and the attacker in case of a successful or an unsuccessful
attack, and are sufficient to define the utilities for both players for
all possible outcomes in the security domain. More formally, if tar-
get t is attacked, the defender’s utility is UcdðtÞ if t is covered, or
UudðtÞ if t is not covered. The attacker’s utility is UcaðtÞ if t is covered,
or Uua ðtÞ if t is not covered. Table 1 shows an example security game
with two targets, t1 and t2. In this example game, if the defender
was covering target t1 and the attacker attacked t1, the defender
would get 10 units of reward whereas the attacker would receive 1
units. We make the assumption that in a security game it is always
better for the defender to cover a target as compared to leaving it un-
covered, whereas it is always better for the attacker to attack an un-
covered target. This assumption is consistent with the payoff trends
in the real world. A special case is “zero-sum games,” in which for
each outcome the sum of utilities for the defender and attacker is
zero, although general security games are not necessarily zero-sum.
Solution concept: strong Stackelberg equilibrium
The solution to a security game is a “mixed” strategy for the de-
fender that maximizes the expected utility of the defender, given
that the attacker learns the mixed strategy of the defender and
Table 1. Example of a security game with two targets
Defender Attacker
Target Covered Uncovered Covered Uncovered
t1 10 0 1 1
t2 0 10 1 1
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chooses a best response for himself. The defender’s mixed strategy is
a probability distribution over all pure strategies, where a pure strat-
egy is an assignment of the defender’s limited security resources
to targets. This solution concept is known as a Stackelberg equilib-
rium [13].
The most commonly adopted version of this concept in related
literature is called strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) [14–17]. In
security games, the mixed strategy of the defender is equivalent to
the probabilities that each target t is covered by the defender,
denoted by C ¼ fctg [18]. Furthermore, it is enough to consider a
pure strategy of the rational adversary [15], which is to attack a tar-
get t. The expected utility for defender for a strategy profile (C, t) is
defined as Udðt;CÞ ¼ ctUcdðtÞ þ ð1  ctÞUudðtÞ, and a similar form
for the adversary. A SSE for the basic security games (non-Bayesian,
rational adversary) is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A pair of strategies C; tð Þ form a SSE if they satisfy
the following:
1. The defender plays a best response: Udðt;CÞUdðtðCÞ;CÞ for
all defender’s strategy C where t(C) is the attacker’s response
against the defender strategy C.
2. The attacker plays a best response: Uaðt;CÞUaðt;CÞ for all
target t.
3. The attacker breaks ties in favor of the defender: Udðt;CÞ
Udðt0;CÞ for all target t0 such that t0 ¼ arg maxtUaðt;CÞ
The assumption that the follower will always break ties in favor
of the leader in cases of indifference is reasonable because in most
cases the leader can induce the favorable strong equilibrium by se-
lecting a strategy arbitrarily close to the equilibrium that causes the
follower to strictly prefer the desired strategy [17]. Furthermore an
SSE exists in all Stackelberg games, which makes it an attractive so-
lution concept compared to versions of Stackelberg equilibrium with
other tie-breaking rules. Finally, although initial applications relied
on the SSE solution concept, we have since proposed new solution
concepts that are more robust against various uncertainties in the
model [19–21] and have used these robust solution concepts in some
of the later applications.
In the following sections, we present three key challenges in solv-
ing real-world security problems which are summarized in Fig. 1: (i)
scaling up to real-world-sized security problems, (ii) handling mul-
tiple uncertainties in security games, and (iii) dealing with bounded
rationality of human adversaries. While Fig. 1 does not provide an
exhaustive overview of all research in SSG, it provides a general
overview of the areas of research. In each case, we will use a domain
example to motivate the specific challenge and then outline the key
algorithmic innovation needed to address the challenge.
Addressing scalability in real-world problems
For simple examples of security games, such as the one shown in the
previous section, the SSE can be calculated by hand. However, as
the size of the game increases, hand calculation is no longer feasible
and an algorithmic approach for generating the SSE becomes neces-
sary. Conitzer and Sandholm [15] provided the first complexity re-
sults and algorithms for computing optimal commitment strategies
in Bayesian Stackelberg games, including both pure and mixed-strat-
egy commitments. An improved algorithm for solving Bayesian
Stackelberg games, Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg
Solver (DOBSS) [16], is central to the fielded application ARMOR in
use at the LAX [1]. These early works required that the full set of
pure strategies for both players be considered when modeling and
solving SSG. However, many real-world problems feature billions of
pure strategies for either the defender and/or the attacker. Such large
problem instances cannot even be represented in modern computers,
let alone solved using previous techniques.
In addition to large strategy spaces, there are other scalability chal-
lenges presented by different real-world security domains. There are
domains where, rather than being static, the targets are moving and
thus the security resources need to be mobile and move in a continu-
ous space to provide protection. There are also domains where the
attacker may not conduct the careful surveillance and planning that is
assumed for a SSE and thus it is important to model the bounded ra-
tionality of the attacker in order to predict their behavior. In the for-
mer case, both the defender and attacker’s strategy spaces are infinite.
In the latter case, computing the optimal strategy for the defender
given attacker behavioral (bounded rationality) model is computation-
ally expensive. In this section, we thus highlight the critical scalability
challenges faced to bring SSG to the real world and the research con-
tributions that served to address these challenges.
Scale-up with large defender strategy spaces
This section provides an example of a research challenge in security
games where the number of defender strategies is too enormous to
be enumerated in computer memory. In this section as in others that
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Figure 1. Summary of real-world security challenges.
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will follow, we will first provide a domain example motivating the
challenge and then the algorithmic solution for the challenge.
Domain example—IRIS for US Federal Air Marshals Service
The US Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) allocates air marshals
to flights departing from and arriving in the USA to dissuade poten-
tial aggressors and prevent an attack should one occur. Flights are of
different importance based on a variety of factors such as the num-
bers of passengers, the population of source and destination cities,
and international flights from different countries. Security resource
allocation in this domain is significantly more challenging than for
ARMOR: a limited number of air marshals need to be scheduled to
cover thousands of commercial flights each day. Furthermore, these
air marshals must be scheduled on tours of flights that obey various
constraints (e.g., the time required to board, fly, and disembark).
Simply finding schedules for the marshals that meet all of these con-
straints is a computational challenge. For an example scenario with
1000 flights and 20 marshals, there are over 1041 possible schedules
that could be considered. Yet there are currently tens of thousands
of commercial flights flying each day, and public estimates state that
there are thousands of air marshals that are scheduled daily by the
FAMS [22]. Air marshals must be scheduled on tours of flights that
obey logistical constraints (e.g., the time required to board, fly, and
disembark). An example of a schedule is an air marshal assigned to
a round trip from New York to London and back.
Against this background, the IRIS system has been developed and
deployed by FAMS since 2009 to randomize schedules of air mar-
shals on international flights. In IRIS, the targets are the set of n
flights and the attacker could potentially choose to attack one of
these flights. The FAMS can assign m<n air marshals that may be
assigned to protect these flights.
Since the number of possible schedules exponentially increases
with the number of flights and resources, DOBSS is no longer applic-
able to the FAMS domain. Instead, IRIS uses the much faster ASPEN
algorithm [23] to generate the schedule for thousands of commercial
flights per day.
Algorithmic solution—incremental strategy generation (ASPEN)
In this section, we describe one particular algorithm ASPEN, that com-
putes SSEs in domains with a “very large” number of pure strategies
(up to billions of actions) for the defender [23]. These pure strategies
can be represented as integral points in a high-dimensional space.
ASPEN builds on the insight that there exist solutions with “small sup-
port sizes,” which are mixed strategies in which only a small set of
pure strategies are played with positive probability (applying
Carathe´odory theorem [24] to the convex hull of pure strategies).
ASPEN exploits this by using a “column generation”- based approach
[25] for the defender, in which defender pure strategies are iteratively
generated and added to the optimization formulation.
In ASPEN’s security game, the attacker can choose any of the
flights to attack, and each air marshal can cover one schedule. Each
schedule here is a feasible set of targets that can be covered together;
for the FAMS, each schedule would represent a flight tour which
satisfies all the logistical constraints that an air marshal could fly.
For example, ft1; t2g would be a flight schedule, where t1 is an out-
bound flight and t2 is an inbound flight for one air marshal. A “joint
schedule” then would assign every air marshal to a flight tour, and
there could be exponentially many joint schedules in the domain. A
pure strategy for the defender in this security game is a joint sched-
ule. Thus, e.g., if there are two air marshals, one possible joint
schedule would be fft1; t2g; ft3; t4gg, where the first air marshal
covers flights t1 and t2, and the second covers flights t3 and t4. As
mentioned previously, ASPEN employs incremental strategy (column)
generation since all the defender pure strategies cannot be enumer-
ated for such a massive problem. ASPEN decomposes the problem
into a “master” problem and a “slave” problem, which are then
solved iteratively. Given a number of pure strategies, the master sol-
ves the optimization problem for the defender and the attacker with
these pure strategies, whereas the slave is used to generate a new
pure strategy for the defender in every iteration. “This incremental,
iterative strategy generation process allows ASPEN to avoid gener-
ation of the entire set of pure strategies.” In other words, by exploit-
ing the small support size mentioned above, only a few pure
strategies get generated via the iterative process; and yet we are
guaranteed to reach the optimal solution.
The iterative process is graphically depicted in Fig. 2. The master
operates on the pure strategies (joint schedules) generated thus far,
which are represented using the matrix P. Each column of P; Jj, is
one pure strategy (or joint schedule). An entry Pij in the matrix P is 1
if a target ti is covered by joint-schedule Jj, and 0 otherwise. For
Figure 2. Strategy generation employed in ASPEN: the schedules for a defender are generated iteratively. The “slave” problem is a novel minimum-cost integer
flow formulation that computes the new pure strategy to be added to P; J4 is computed and added in this example.
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example, in Fig. 2, the joint schedule J3 covers target t1 but not tar-
get t2. The objective of the master problem is to compute x, the opti-
mal mixed strategy of the defender over the pure strategies in P. The
objective of the slave problem is to generate the best joint schedule
(pure strategy) to add to P. The best joint schedule is identified using
the concept of “reduced costs,” which measures if a pure strategy
can potentially increase the defender’s expected utility (the details of
the approach are provided in [23]). While a naı¨ve approach would
be to iterate over all possible pure strategies to identify the pure
strategy with the maximum potential, ASPEN formulates the slave
problem as a minimum-cost integer flow problem to efficiently iden-
tify the best pure strategy to add. ASPEN always converges on the op-
timal mixed strategy for the defender.
Employing incremental strategy (column) generation for large
optimization problems is not an “out-of-the-box” approach; the
problem has to be formulated in a way that allows for domain prop-
erties to be exploited. The novel contribution of ASPEN is to provide
a linear formulation for the master and a minimum-cost integer flow
formulation for the slave, which enables the application of strategy
generation techniques.
Scale-up with large defender and attacker strategy
spaces
Whereas the previous section focused on domains where only the de-
fender’s strategy was difficult to enumerate, we now turn to do-
mains where both defender and attacker strategies are difficult to
enumerate. Once again we provide a domain example and then an
algorithmic solution.
Domain example—road network security
One area of great importance is securing urban city networks, trans-
portation networks, computer networks, and other network-centric se-
curity domains. For example, after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai of
2008 [26], the Mumbai police started setting up vehicular checkpoints
on roads. We can model the problem faced by the Mumbai police as a
security game between the Mumbai police and an attacker. In this
urban security game, the pure strategies of the defender correspond to
allocations of resources to edges in the network—e.g., an allocation of
police checkpoints to roads in the city. The pure strategies of the at-
tacker correspond to paths from any “source” node to any “target”
node—e.g., a path from a landing spot on the coast to the airport.
The strategy space of the defender grows exponentially with the
number of available resources, whereas the strategy space of the at-
tacker grows exponentially with the size of the network. For ex-
ample, in a fully connected graph with 20 nodes and 190 edges,
the number of defender pure strategies for only 5 defender resources
is
190
5
 
or almost 2 billion, while the number of attacker pure
strategies (i.e., paths without cycles) is on the order of 1018. Real-
world networks are significantly larger, e.g., the entire road network
of the city of Mumbai has 9503 nodes (intersections) and 20 416
edges (streets), and the security forces can deploy dozens (but not as
many as number of edges) of resources. In addressing this computa-
tional challenge, novel algorithms based on incremental strategy
generation have been able to generate randomized defender strat-
egies that scale-up to the entire road network of Mumbai [27].
Algorithmic solution—double oracle incremental strategy
generation (RUGGED)
In domains such as the urban network security setting, the number
of pure strategies of both the defender and the attacker are
exponentially large. In this section, we describe the RUGGED algo-
rithm [28], which generates pure strategies for both the defender
and the attacker. This algorithm is inspired by the double oracle al-
gorithm of solving large-scale games [29].
RUGGED models the domain as a zero-sum game, and computes
the minimax equilibrium, since the minimax strategy is equivalent
to the SSE in zero-sum games. Figure 3 shows the working of
RUGGED: at each iteration, the Minimax module generates the opti-
mal mixed strategies hx; ai for the two players for the current payoff
matrix, the Best Response Defender module generates a new strategy
for the defender that is a best response against the attacker’s current
strategy a, and the Best Response Attacker module generates a new
strategy for the attacker that is a best response against the defender’s
current strategy x. The rows Xi in the figure are the pure strategies
for the defender; they would correspond to an allocation of check-
points in the urban road network domain. Similarly, the columns Aj
are the pure strategies for the attacker; they represent the attack
paths in the urban road network domain. The values in the matrix
represent the payoffs to the defender. For example, in Fig. 3, the
row denoted by X1 indicates that there was one checkpoint setup,
and it provides a defender payoff of 5 against attacker strategy
(path) A1, and a payoff of 10 against attacker strategy (path) A2.
In Fig. 3, we show that RUGGED iterates over two oracles: the de-
fender best response and the attacker best response oracles. In this
case, the defender best response oracle has added a strategy X2, and
the attacker best response oracle then adds a strategy A3. The algo-
rithm stops when neither of the generated best responses improves
on the current minimax strategies.
The contribution of RUGGED is to provide the mixed integer for-
mulations for the best response modules which enable the applica-
tion of such a strategy generation approach. The key once again is
that RUGGED is able to converge to the optimal solution without enu-
merating the entire space of defender and attacker strategies.
However, originally RUGGED could only compute the optimal solu-
tion for deploying up to four resources in real-city network with 250
nodes within a time frame of 10 h (the complexity of this problem
can be estimated by observing that both the best response problems
are NP-hard themselves [28]). More recent work [27] builds on
RUGGED and proposes SNARES, which allows scale-up to the entire
city of Mumbai, with 10–15 checkpoints.
Scale-up with mobile resources and moving targets
Whereas the previous two sections focused on incremental strategy
generation as an approach for scale-up, this section introduces an-
other approach: use of compact marginal probability
Figure 3. Strategy generation employed in RUGGED: the pure strategies for
both the defender and the attacker are generated iteratively.
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representations. This alternative approach is shown in use in the
context of a new application of protecting ferries.
Domain example—ferry protection for the USCG
The USCG is responsible for protecting domestic ferries, including
the Staten Island Ferry in New York, from potential terrorist at-
tacks. Here are a number of ferries carrying hundreds of passengers
in many waterside cities. These ferries are attractive targets for an
attacker who can approach the ferries with a small boat packed
with explosives at any time; this attacker’s boat may only be de-
tected when it comes close to the ferries. Small, fast, and well-armed
patrol boats can provide protection to such ferries by detecting the
attacker within a certain distance and stop him from attacking with
the armed weapons (Figure 4). However, the numbers of patrol
boats are often limited, thus the defender cannot protect the ferries
at all times and locations. We thus developed a game-theoretic sys-
tem for scheduling escort boat patrols to protect ferries, and this has
been deployed at the Staten Island Ferry since 2013 [3].
The key research challenge is the fact that the ferries are continu-
ously moving in a continuous domain, and the attacker could attack
at any moment in time. This type of moving targets domain leads to
game-theoretic models with continuous strategy spaces, which pre-
sents computational challenges. Our theoretical work showed that
while it is “safe” to discretize the defender’s strategy space (in the
sense that the solution quality provided by our work provides a
lower bound), discretizing the attacker’s strategy space would result
in loss of utility (in the sense that this would provide only an upper
bound, and thus an unreliable guarantee of true solution quality).
We developed a novel algorithm that uses a compact representation
for the defender’s mixed strategy space while being able to exactly
model the attacker’s continuous strategy space. The implemented al-
gorithm, running on a laptop, is able to generate daily schedules for
escort boats with guaranteed expected utility values.
Algorithmic solution—compact strategy representation (CASS)
In this section, we describe the CASS (Solver for Continuous Attacker
Strategy) algorithm [3] for solving security problems where the de-
fender has mobile patrollers to protect a set of mobile targets against
the attacker who can attack these moving targets at any time during
their movement. In these security problems, the sets of pure strat-
egies for both the defender and attacker are continuous with respect
to the continuous spatial and time components of the problem do-
main. The CASS algorithm attempts to compute the optimal mixed
strategy for the defender without discretizing the attacker’s continu-
ous strategy set; it exactly models this set using sub-interval analysis
that exploits the piecewise-linear structure of the attacker’s expected
utility function. The insight of CASS is to compactly represent the de-
fender’s mixed strategies as a “marginal” probability distribution,
overcoming the short-coming of an exponential number of pure
strategies for the defender.
CASS casts problems such as the ferry protection problem men-
tioned above as a “zero-sum” security game in which targets move
along a “one-dimensional” domain, i.e., a straight line segment con-
necting two terminal points. This “one-dimensional” assumption is
valid as in real-world domains such as ferry protection, ferries nor-
mally move back-and-forth in a straight line between two terminals
(i.e., ports) around the world. Although the locations of the targets
vary with respect to time changes, these targets have a fixed daily
schedule, meaning that determining the locations of the targets at a
certain time is straightforward. The defender has mobile patrollers
(i.e., boats) that can move along between two terminals to protect
the targets. While the defender is trying to protect the targets, the at-
tacker will decide to attack a certain target at a certain time. The
probability that the attacker successfully attacks depends on the pos-
itions of the patroller at that time. Specifically, each patroller pos-
sesses a protective circle of radius within which she can detect and
try to intercept any attack, whereas she is incapable of detecting the
attacker prior to that radius.
In CASS, the defender’s strategy space is discretized and her mixed
strategy is compactly represented using flow distributions. Figure 5
shows an example of a ferry transition graph in which each node of
the graph indicates a particular pair (location, time step) for the tar-
get. Here, there are three location points namely A, B, and C on a
straight line where B lies between A and C. Initially, the target is at
one of these location points at the 5-min time step. Then the target
moves to the next location point which is determined based on the
connectivity between these points at the 10-min time step and so on.
For example, if the target is at the location point A at the 5-min time
step, denoted by (A, 5 min) in the transition graph, it can move to
the location point B or stay at location point A at the 10-min time
step. The defender follows this transition graph to protect the target.
A pure strategy for the defender is defined as a trajectory of this
graph, e.g., the trajectory including (A, 5 min), (B, 10 min), and (C,
15 min) indicates a pure strategy for the defender. One key challenge
of this representation for the defender’s pure strategies is that the
transition graph consists of an exponential number of trajectories,
i.e., OðNTÞ where N is the number of location points and T is the
number of time steps. To address this challenge, CASS proposes a
compact representation of the defender’s mixed strategy. Instead of
directly computing a probability distribution over pure strategies for
the defender, CASS attempts to compute the marginal probability
that the defender will follow a certain edge of the transition graph,
e.g., the probability of being at the node (A, 5 min) and moving to
Figure 5. An example of a ferry transition graph.
Figure 4. Escort boats protecting the Staten Island Ferry use strategies gener-
ated by our system.
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the node (B, 10 min). CASS shows that “any strategy in full represen-
tation can be mapped into a compact representation” as well as
“compact representation does not lead to any loss in solution qual-
ity”. This compact representation allows CASS to reformulate the re-
source-allocation problem as computing the optimal “marginal”
coverage of the defender over a number of O(NT) edges of the tran-
sition graph.
Scale-up with boundedly rational attackers
One key challenge of real-world security problems is that the at-
tacker is boundedly rational; the attacker’s target choice is nonopti-
mal. In SSGs, attacker-bounded rationality is often modeled via
behavior models such as Quantal Response (QR) [30, 31]. In gen-
eral, QR attempts to predict the probability the attacker will choose
each target with the intuition is that the higher the expected utility
at a target is, the more likely that the adversary will attack that tar-
get. Another behavioral model that was recently shown to provide
higher prediction accuracy in predicting the attacker’s behavior than
QR is Subjective Utility QR (SUQR) [32]. SUQR is motivated by the
lens model which suggested that evaluation of adversaries over tar-
gets is based on a linear combination of multiple observable features
[33]. However, handling multiple attackers with these behavioral
models in the context of large defender’s strategy space is computa-
tional challenge. In this section, we mainly focus on handling the
scalability problem given behavioral models of the attacker. The
problem of handling the attacker’s bounded rationality (e.g., model-
ing and learning) is explained in detail in “Addressing bounded ra-
tionality in real-world problems” section.
To handle the problem of large defender’s strategy space given
behavioral models of attackers, we introduce yet another technique
of scaling up, which is similar to the incremental strategy gener-
ation. Instead, here we use incremental marginal space refinement.
We use the compact marginal representation, discussed earlier, but
refine that space incrementally if the solution produces violates the
necessary constraints.
Domain example—fishery protection for USCG
Fisheries are a vital natural resource from both an ecological and
economic standpoint. However, fish stocks around the world are
threatened with collapse due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated
(IUU) fishing. The USCG is tasked with the responsibility of protect-
ing and maintaining the nation’s fisheries. To this end, the USCG de-
ploys resources (both air and surface assets) to conduct patrols over
fishery areas in order to deter and mitigate IUU fishing. Due to the
large size of these patrol areas and the limited patrolling resources
available, it is impossible to protect an entire fishery from IUU fish-
ing at all times. Thus, an intelligent allocation of patrolling re-
sources is critical for security agencies like the USCG.
Natural resource conservation domains such as fishery protec-
tion raise a number of new research challenges. In stark contrast to
counter-terrorism settings, there is frequent interaction between the
defender and attacker in these resource conservation domains. This
distinction is important for three reasons. First, due to the compara-
tively low stakes of the interactions, rather than a handful of persons
or groups, the defender must protect against numerous adversaries
(potentially hundreds or even more), each of which may behave dif-
ferently. Second, frequent interactions make it possible to collect
data on the actions of the adversaries over time. Third, the adversa-
ries are less strategic given the short planning windows between
actions.
Algorithmic solution—incremental constraint generation (MIDAS)
Generating effective strategies for domains such as fishery protec-
tion requires an algorithmic approach which is both “scalable” and
“robust”. For scalability, the defender is responsible for protecting a
large patrol area and therefore must consider a large strategy space.
Even if the patrol area is discretized into a grid or graph structure,
the defender must still reason over an exponential number of patrol
strategies. For robustness, the defender must protect against “mul-
tiple” boundedly rational adversaries. Bounded rationality models,
such as the QR model [31] and the SUQR model [32], introduce sto-
chastic actions, relaxing the strong assumption in classical game the-
ory that all players are perfectly rational and utility maximizing.
These models are able to better predict the actions of human adver-
saries and thus lead the defender to choose strategies that perform
better in practice. However, both QR and SUQR are nonlinear mod-
els resulting in a computationally difficult optimization problem for
the defender. Combining these factors, MIDAS models a population
of boundedly rational adversaries and utilizes available data to learn
the behavior models of the adversaries using the SUQR model in
order to improve the way the defender allocates its patrolling
resources.
Previous work on boundedly rational adversaries has considered
the challenges of scalability and robustness separately, in [34, 35]
and [5, 6], respectively. The MIDAS algorithm was introduced to
merge these two research threads for the first time by addressing
scalability and robustness simultaneously. Figure 6 provides a visual
overview of how MIDAS operates as an iterative process. Similar to
the ASPEN algorithm described earlier, given the sheer complexity of
the game being solved, the problem is decomposed using a master–
slave formulation. The master utilizes multiple simplifications to
create a relaxed version of the original problem which is more effi-
cient to solve. First, a piecewise-linear approximation of the security
game is taken to make the optimization problem both linear and
convex. Second, the complex spatiotemporal constraints associated
with patrols are initially ignored and then incrementally added back
using cut generation. In other words, we ignore the spatiotemporal
constraint that a patroller cannot simple appear and disappear at
different locations instantaneously; and that a patroller must pass
through regions connecting two different regions if the patroller is
go from one region to another. This significantly simplifies the mas-
ter problem.
Figure 6. Overview of the multiple iterative process within the MIDAS
algorithm.
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Due to the relaxations, solving the master produces a marginal
strategy x which is a probability distribution over targets. However,
the defender ultimately needs a probability distribution over patrols.
Additionally, since not all of the spatiotemporal constraints are con-
sidered in the master, the relaxed solution x may not be a feasible so-
lution to the original problem. Therefore, the slave checks if the
marginal strategy x can expressed as a linear combination, i.e., prob-
ability distribution, of patrols. Otherwise, the marginal distribution
is infeasible for the original problem. However, given the exponen-
tial number of patrol strategies, even performing this optimality
check is intractable. Thus, column generation is used “within” the
slave where only a small set of patrols is considered initially in the
optimality check and the set is expanded over time. Much like previ-
ous examples of column generation in security games, e.g., [23],
new patrols are added by solving a minimum-cost network flow
problem using reduced cost information from the optimality check.
If the optimality check fails, then the slave generates a cut which is
returned to refine and constrain the master, incrementally bringing
it closer to the original problem. The entire process is repeated until
an optimal solution is found. Finally, MIDAS has been successfully
deployed and evaluated by the USCG in the Gulf of Mexico.
Addressing uncertainty in real-world problems
The standard security game model features a number of strong as-
sumptions including that the defender has perfect information about
the game payoff matrix as well as the attacker’s behavioral model.
Additionally, the defender is assumed to be capable of exactly exe-
cuting the computed patrolling strategy. However, uncertainty is en-
demic in real-world security domains and thus it may be impossible
or impractical for the defender to accurately estimate various aspects
of the game. Also, there are many number of practicalities and un-
foreseen events that may force the defender to change their patrol-
ling strategy. These types of uncertainty can significantly deteriorate
the effectiveness of the defender’s strategy and thus addressing un-
certainty when generating strategies is a key challenge of solving
real-world security problems. This section describes several
approaches for dealing with various types of uncertainties in SSGs.
We first summarize the major types of uncertainties in SSGs as a
3-dimensional uncertainty space with the following three dimen-
sions (Fig. 7): (i) uncertainty in the adversary’s payoffs; (ii) uncer-
tainty related to the defender’s strategy (including uncertainty in the
defender’s execution and the attacker’s observation); and (iii) uncer-
tainty in the adversary’s rationality. These dimensions refer to three
key attributes which affect both players’ utilities. The origin of the
uncertainty space corresponds to the case with no uncertainty.
Figure 7 also shows existing algorithms for addressing uncertainty
in SSGs which follow the two different approaches. First approach
is applying robust optimization techniques using uncertainty inter-
vals to represent uncertainty in SSGs. For example, BRASS [36] is a
robust algorithm that only addresses attacker-payoff uncertainty,
RECON [19] is another robust algorithm that focuses on addressing
defender-strategy uncertainty, and Monotonic Maximin [37] is to
handle the uncertainty in the attacker’s bounded rationality. Finally,
URAC (Unified Robust Algorithmic framework for addressing
unCertainties) [38] is a unified robust algorithm that handles all
types of uncertainty. The second approach is based on the Bayesian
Stackelberg game model with dynamic execution uncertainty in
which the uncertainty is represented using Markov Decision Process
(MDP) where the time factor is incorporated.
In the following, we present two algorithmic solutions which are
the representatives of these two approaches: URAC—a unified robust
algorithm to handle all types of uncertainty with uncertainty inter-
vals and the MDP-based algorithm to handle execution uncertainty
with an MDP representation of uncertainty.
Security patrolling with unified uncertainty space
Domain example—security in LAX
LAX is the largest destination airport in the USA and serves 60–70
million passengers per year. The LAX police use diverse measures to
protect the airport, which include vehicular checkpoints, police units
patrolling the roads to the terminals, patrolling inside the terminals
(with canines), and security screening and bag checks for passengers.
The application of our game-theoretic approach is focused on two
of these measures: (i) placing vehicle checkpoints on inbound roads
that service the LAX terminals, including both location and timing,
and (ii) scheduling patrols for bomb-sniffing canine units at the dif-
ferent LAX terminals. The eight different terminals at LAX have
very different characteristics, like physical size, passenger loads,
international versus domestic flights, etc. These factors contribute to
the differing risk assessments of these eight terminals. Furthermore,
the numbers of available vehicle checkpoints and canine units are
limited by resource constraints. Thus, it is challenging to optimally
allocate these resources to improve their effectiveness while avoiding
patterns in the scheduled deployments.
The ARMOR system focuses on two of the security measures at
LAX (checkpoints and canine patrols) and optimizes security re-
source allocation using Bayesian Stackelberg games (Figure 8). Take
the vehicle checkpoints model as an example. Assuming that there
are n roads, the police’s strategy is placing m<n checkpoints on
these roads where m is the maximum number of checkpoints.
Figure 7. Uncertainty space and algorithms. Figure 8. LAX checkpoints are deployed using ARMOR.
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ARMOR randomizes allocation of checkpoints to roads. The adver-
sary may conduct surveillance of this mixed strategy and may poten-
tially choose to attack through one of these roads. ARMOR models
different types of attackers with different payoff functions, repre-
senting different capabilities and preferences for the attacker.
ARMOR has been successfully deployed since August 2007 at LAX
[1].
Although standard SSG-based solutions (i.e., DOBSS) have been
demonstrated to improve the defender’s patrolling effectiveness sig-
nificantly, there remains potential improvements that can be made
to further enhance the quality of such solutions such as taking uncer-
tainties in payoff values, in the attacker’s rationality, and in de-
fender’s execution into account. Therefore, we propose the unified
robust algorithm, URAC, to handle these types of uncertainties by
maximizing the defender’s utility against the worst case scenario re-
sulting from these uncertainties.
Algorithmic solution—uncertainty dimension reduction (URAC)
In this section, we present the robust URAC algorithm for addressing
a combination of all uncertainty types [38]. Consider an SSG where
there is uncertainty in the attacker’s payoff, the defender’s strategy
(including the defender’s execution and the attacker’s observation),
and the attacker’s behavior, URAC represents all these uncertainty
types (except for the attacker’s behaviors) using uncertainty inter-
vals. Instead of knowing exactly values of these game attributes, the
defender only has prior information with respect to the upper
bounds and lower bounds of these attributes. For example, the at-
tacker’s reward if successfully attacking a target t is known to lie
within the interval ½1; 3. Furthermore, URAC assumes the attacker
monotonically responds to the defender’s strategy. In other words,
the higher the expected utility of a target, the more likely that the at-
tacker will attack that target; however, the precise attacking prob-
ability is unknown for the defender. This monotonicity assumption
is motivated by the QR model—a well-known human behavioral
model for capturing the attacker’s decision making [31].
Based on these uncertainty assumptions, URAC attempts to com-
pute the optimal strategy for the defender by maximizing her utility
against the worst case scenario of uncertainty. The key challenge of
this optimization problem is that it involves several types of uncer-
tainty, resulting in multiple minimization steps for determining the
worst case scenario. Nevertheless, URAC introduces a unified repre-
sentation of all these uncertainty types as a uncertainty set of
attacker’s responses. Intuitively, despite of any type of uncertainty
mentioned above, what finally affects the defender’s utility is the at-
tacker’s response, which is unknown to the defender due to uncer-
tainty. As a result, URAC can represent the robust optimization
problem as a single maximin problem.
However, the infinite uncertainty set of the attacker’s responses
depends on the planned mixed strategy for the defender, making this
maximin problem difficult to solve if the traditional method is directly
applied (i.e., taking the dual maximization of the inner minimization
of maximin and merging it with the outer maximization—maximin
now can be represented as a single maximization problem).
Therefore, URAC proposes a divide-and-conquer method in which the
defender’s strategy set is divided into subsets such that the uncertainty
set of the attacker’s responses is the same for every defender strategy
within each subset. This division leads to multiple sub-maximin prob-
lems which can be solved by using the traditional method. The opti-
mal solution of the original maximin problem can now be computed
as a maximum over all the sub-maximin problems.
Security patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty
Domain example—TRUSTS for security in transit systems
Urban transit systems face multiple security challenges, including
deterring fare evasion, suppressing crime and counter-terrorism. In
particular, in some urban transit systems, including the Los Angeles
Metro Rail system, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets
before entering but are not physically forced to do so (Fig. 9). Instead,
security personnel are dynamically deployed throughout the transit
system, randomly inspecting passenger tickets. This proof-of-payment
fare collection method is typically chosen as a more cost-effective
alternative to direct fare collection, i.e., when the revenue lost to fare
evasion is believed to be less than what it would cost to directly pre-
clude it. In the case of Los Angeles Metro, with approximately
300 000 riders daily, this revenue loss can be significant; the annual
cost has been estimated at $5.6 million [39]. The LASD deploys uni-
formed patrols on board trains and at stations for fare-checking (and
for other purposes such as crime prevention). The LASD’s current
approach relies on humans for scheduling the patrols, which places a
tremendous cognitive burden on the human schedulers who must take
into account all of the scheduling complexities (e.g., train timings,
switching time between trains, and schedule lengths).
The TRUSTS models the patrolling problem as a leader–follower
Stackelberg game [4]. The leader (LASD) precommits to a mixed
Figure 9. TRUSTS for transit systems.
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strategy patrol (a probability distribution over all pure strategies),
and riders observe this mixed strategy before deciding whether to
buy the ticket or not. Both ticket sales and fines issued for fare eva-
sion translate into revenue for the government. Therefore the utility
for the leader is the total revenue (total ticket sales plus penalties).
The main computational challenge is the exponentially many pos-
sible patrol strategies, each subject to both the spatial and temporal
constraints of travel within the transit network under consideration.
To overcome this challenge, TRUSTS uses a compact representation of
the strategy space which captures the spatiotemporal structure of
the domain.
The LASD conducted field tests of this TRUSTS system in the LA
Metro in 2012, and one of the feedback comments from the officers
was that patrols are often interrupted due to execution uncertainty
such as emergencies and arrests.
Algorithmic solution—marginal MDP strategy representation
Utilizing techniques from planning under uncertainty (in particular,
MDPs), we proposed a general approach to dynamic patrolling
games in uncertain environments, which provides patrol strategies
with contingency plans [40]. This led to schedules now being loaded
onto smartphones and given to officers. If interruptions occur, the
schedules are then automatically updated on the smartphone app.
The LASD has conducted successful field evaluations using the
smartphone app. We now describe the solution approach in more
detail. Note that the targets, e.g., trains normally follow predeter-
mined schedules, thus timing is an important aspect which deter-
mines the effectiveness of the defender’s patrolling schedules (the
defender needs to be at the right location at a specific time in order
to protect these moving targets). However, as a result of execution
uncertainty (e.g., emergencies or errors), the defender could not
carry out her planned patrolling schedule in later time steps. For ex-
ample, in real-world trials for TRUSTS carried out by LASD, there is
interruption (due to writing citations, felony arrests, and handling
emergencies) in a significant fraction of the executions, causing the
officers to miss the train they are supposed to catch as following the
pre-generated patrolling schedule.
In this section, we present the Bayesian Stackelberg game model
for security patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty intro-
duced by [40] in which the uncertainty is represented using MDPs.
The key advantage of this game-theoretic model is that patrol sched-
ules which are computed based on Stackelberg equilibrium have
contingency plans to deal with interruptions and are robust against
execution uncertainty. Specifically, the security problem with execu-
tion uncertainty is represented as a two-player Bayesian Stackelberg
game between the defender and the attacker. The defender has mul-
tiple patrol units while there are also multiple types of attackers
which are unknown to the defender. A (naive) patrol schedule con-
sists of a set of sequenced commands in the following form: at time
t, the patrol unit should be at location l, and execute patrol action a.
This patrol action a will take the unit to the next location and time
if successfully executed. However, due to execution uncertainty, the
patrol unit may end up at a different location and time. Figure 10
shows an example of execution uncertainty in a transition graph
where if the patrol unit is currently at location A at the 5-min time
step, she is supposed to take the on-train action to move to location
B in the next time step. However, unlike CASS for ferry protection in
which the defender’s action is deterministic, there is a 10% chance
that she will still stay at location A due to execution uncertainty.
This interaction of the defender with the environment when execut-
ing patrol can be represented as an MDP.
In essence, the transition graph as represented above is aug-
mented to indicate the possibility that there are multiple uncertain
outcomes possible from a given state. Solving this transition graph
results in marginals over MDP policies. When a sample MDP policy
is obtained and loaded on to a smart phone, it provides a patroller
not only the current action but contingency actions also, should the
current action fail or succeed. So the MDP policy provides options
for the patroller, allowing the system to handle execution uncer-
tainty. A key challenge of computing the SSE for this type of security
problem is that the dimension of the space of mixed strategies for
the defender is exponential in the number of states in terms of the
defender’s times and locations. Therefore, instead of directly com-
puting the mixed strategy, the defender attempts to compute the
marginal probabilities of each patrolling unit reaching a state
s ¼ ðt; lÞ, and taking action a which have dimensions polynomial in
the sizes of the MDPs (the details of this approach are provided in
[40]).
Addressing bounded rationality in real-world
problems
Game theory models the strategic interactions between multiple
players who are assumed to be perfectly rational, i.e., they will al-
ways select the optimal strategy available to them. This assumption
may be applicable for high-stakes security domains such as infra-
structure protection where presumably the adversary will conduct
careful surveillance and planning before attacking. However, there
are other security domains where the adversary may not be perfectly
rational due to short planning windows or because the adversary is
less strategic due to lower stakes associated with attacking. Security
strategies generated under the assumption of a perfectly rational ad-
versary are not necessarily as effective as would be feasible against a
less-than-optimal response. Therefore, addressing the boundedly ra-
tionality exhibited by human adversaries is a fundamental challenge
for applying security games to wide variety of domains.
Domain example—green security domains
A number of our newer applications are focused on resource conser-
vation, through suppression of environmental crime. One area is
protecting forests [41], where we must protect a continuous forest
area from extractors by patrols through the forest that seek to deter
such extraction activity (Figure 11). With limited resources for per-
forming such patrols, a patrol strategy will seek to distribute the
patrols throughout the forest, in space and time, in order to minim-
ize the resulting amount of extraction that occurs or maximize the
degree of forest protection. This problem can be formulated as a
Stackelberg game and the focus is on computing optimal allocations
of patrol density [41].
Figure 10. An example of execution uncertainty in a transition graph.
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Endangered species poaching is reaching critical levels as the
populations of these species plummet to unsustainable numbers.
The global tiger population, e.g., has dropped over 95% from the
start of the 1900s and has resulted in three out of nine species ex-
tinctions. Depending on the area and animals poached, motivations
for poaching range from profit to sustenance, with the former being
more common when profitable species such as tigers, elephants, and
rhinos are the targets. To counter poaching efforts and to rebuild
the species’ populations, countries have set up protected wildlife re-
serves and conservation agencies tasked with defending these large
reserves. Because of the size of the reserves and the common lack of
law enforcement resources, conservation agencies are at a significant
disadvantage when it comes to deterring and capturing poachers.
Agencies use patrolling as a primary method of securing the park.
Due to their limited resources, however, patrol managers must care-
fully create patrols that account for many different variables (e.g.,
limited patrol units to send out, multiple locations that poachers can
attack at varying distances to the outpost).
Behavioral modeling and learning
Recently, we have conducted some research on applying ideas from
behavioral game theory (e.g., prospect theory [42] and QR [43])
within security game algorithms. One line of approaches is based on
the QR model to predict the behaviors of the human adversary, and
then to compute optimal defender strategies against such behavior
of the adversary. These include BRQR [44] which follows the logit
QR [43] model and subsequent work on SUQR models [32]. The
parameters of these models are estimated by experimental tuning.
Data from a large set of participants on the Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) were collected and used to learn the parameters of the
behavioral models to predict future attacks. In real-world domains
like fisheries protection, or wildlife crime, there are repeated interac-
tions between the defender and the adversary, where the game pro-
gresses in “rounds.” We call this a Repeated SSG (RSSG) where in
each round the defender would play a particular strategy and the ad-
versary would observe that strategy and act accordingly. In order to
simulate this scenario and conduct experiments to identify adversary
behavior in such repeated settings, an online RSSG game was de-
veloped (shown in Fig. 12) and deployed.
In our game, human subjects play the role of poachers looking to
place a snare to hunt a hippopotamus in a protected wildlife park.
The portion of the park shown in the map is actually a Google Maps
view of a portion of the QENP in Uganda. The region shown is div-
ided into a 5*5 grid, i.e., 25 distinct cells. Overlaid on the Google
Figure 11. Examples of illegal activities in green security domains.
Figure 12. Interface of the wildlife poaching game to simulate an RSSG.
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Maps view of the park is a heat-map, which represents the rangers’
mixed strategy x—a cell i with higher coverage probability xi is
shown more in red, while a cell with lower coverage probability is
shown more in green. As the subjects play the game and click on a
particular region on the map, they were given detailed information
about the poacher’s reward, penalty, and coverage probability at
that region. However, the participants are unaware of the exact lo-
cation of the rangers while playing the game, i.e., they do not know
the pure strategy that will be played by the rangers, which is drawn
randomly from mixed strategy x shown on the game interface. In
our game, there were nine rangers protecting this park, with each
ranger protecting one grid cell. Therefore, at any point in time, only
9 out of the 25 distinct regions in the park are protected. A player
succeeds if he places a snare in a region which is not protected by a
ranger, else he is unsuccessful. Similar to the Guards and Treasures
game, here also we recruited human subjects on AMT and asked
them to play this game repeatedly for a set of rounds with the de-
fender strategy changing per round based on the behavioral model
being used to learn the adversary’s behavior.
While behavioral models like QR [43] and SUQR [32] assume
that there is a homogeneous population of adversaries, in the real
world we face heterogeneous populations of adversaries. Therefore
Bayesian SUQR was proposed to learn the behavioral model for
each attack [5]. Protection Assistant for Wildlife Security (PAWS) is
an application which was originally created using Bayesian SUQR.
However, in real-world security domains, we may have very limited
data, or may only have some limited information on the biases dis-
played by adversaries. An alternative approach is based on robust
optimization: instead of assuming a particular model of human deci-
sion making, try to achieve good defender expected utility against a
range of possible models. One instance of this approach is MATCH
[21], which guarantees a bound for the loss of the defender to be
within a constant factor of the adversary loss if the adversary re-
sponds nonoptimally. Another robust solution concept is monotonic
maximin [37], which tries to optimize defender utility against the
worst case monotonic adversary behavior, where monotonicity is
the property that actions with higher expected utility is played with
higher probability. Recently, there have been attempts to combine
such robust optimization approaches with available behavior data
[6] for RSSGs, resulting in a new human behavior model called
Robust SUQR. However, one question of research is how these pro-
posed models and algorithms will fare against human subjects in
RSSGs. This has been explored in recent research [45] in the “first-
of-its-kind” human subjects experiments in RSSGs over a period of
46 weeks with the “Wildlife Poaching” game, a brief summary of
which is presented below.
In our human subjects experiments in RSSGs, we observe that:
(i) existing approaches (QR, SUQR, Bayesian SUQR) [5, 6, 32] per-
form poorly in initial rounds, while Bayesian SUQR which is the
basis for PAWS [5], perform poorly throughout all rounds; (ii) sur-
prisingly, simpler models like SUQR which were originally proposed
for single-shot games performed better than recent advances like
Bayesian SUQR and Robust SUQR which are geared specifically to-
ward addressing repeated SSGs. Therefore, we proposed a new
model called SHARP (Stochastic Human behavior model with
AttRactiveness and Probability weighting) [45] which addresses the
limitations of the existing models in the following way: (i) modeling
the adversary’s adaptive decision making process in repeated SSGs,
SHARP reasons based on success or failure of the adversary’s past
actions on exposed portions of the attack surface, where attack sur-
face is defined as the n-dimensional space of the features used to
model adversary behavior; (ii) addressing limited exposure to
significant portions of the attack surface in initial rounds, SHARP
reasons about similarity between exposed and unexposed areas of
the attack surface, and also incorporates a discounting parameter to
mitigate adversary’s lack of exposure to enough of the attack sur-
face; (iii) addressing the limitation that existing models do not ac-
count for the adversary’s weighting of probabilities, we incorporate
a two-parameter probability weighting function. Based on our
human subjects experiments highlighted in [45], we observe that
SHARP completely outperforms existing approaches consistently
over all rounds, most notably in initial rounds.
Addressing field evaluation in real-world
problems
Evidence showing the benefits of the algorithms discussed in the previ-
ous sections is definitely an important issue that is necessary for us to
answer. Unlike conceptual ideas, where we can run thousands of care-
ful simulations under controlled conditions, we cannot conduct such
experiments in the real world with our deployed applications. Nor
can we provide a proof of 100% security—there is no such thing.
Instead, we focus on the specific question of: are our game-
theoretic algorithms better at security resource optimization or se-
curity allocation than how they were allocated previously, which
was typically relying on human schedulers or a simple dice roll for
security scheduling (simple dice roll is often the other automation
that is used or offered as an alternative to our methods). We have
used the following methods to illustrate these ideas. These methods
range from simulations to actual field tests.
1. Simulations (including using a machine learning attacker): we
provide simulations of security schedules, e.g., randomized pa-
trols, assignments, comparing our approach to earlier approaches
based on techniques used by human schedulers. We have a ma-
chine learning-based attacker who learns any patterns and then
chooses to attack the facility being protected. Game-theoretic
schedulers are seen to perform significantly better in providing
higher levels of protections [1, 46]. This is also shown in Fig. 13.
2. Human adversaries in the lab: we have worked with a large
number of human subjects and security experts (security offi-
cials) to have them get through randomized security schedules,
where some are schedules generated by our algorithms, and
some are baseline approaches for comparison. Human subjects
are paid money based on the reward they collect by successfully
intruding through our security schedules; again our game-theor-
etic schedulers perform significantly better ([47]).
3. Actual security schedules before and after: for some security ap-
plications, we have data on how scheduling was done by humans
(before our algorithms were deployed) and how schedules are
generated after the deployment of our algorithms. For measures
of interest to security agencies, e.g., predictability in schedules,
Figure 13. ARMOR evaluation results.
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we can compare the actual human-generated schedules versus
our algorithmic schedules. Again, game-theoretic schedulers are
seen to perform significantly better by avoiding predictability
and yet ensuring that more important targets are covered with
higher frequency of patrols. Some of this data is published [2]
and is also shown in Fig. 14.
4. “Adversary” teams simulate attack: in some cases, security agen-
cies have deployed adversary perspective teams or mock attacker
teams that will attempt to conduct surveillance to plan attacks;
this is done before and after our algorithms have been deployed
to check which security deployments worked better. This was
done by the USCG indicating that the game-theoretic scheduler
provided higher levels of deterrence [2].
5. Real-time comparison—human versus algorithm: this is a test we
ran on the metro trains in Los Angeles. For a day of patrol sched-
uling, we provided head-to-head comparison of human sched-
ulers trying to schedule 90 officers on patrols versus an
automated game-theoretic scheduler. External evaluators then
provided an evaluation of these patrols; the evaluators did not
know who had generated each of the schedules. The results show
that while human schedulers required significant effort even for
generating one schedule (almost a day), and the game-theoretic
scheduler ran quickly, the external evaluators rated the game-
theoretic schedulers higher (with statistical significance) [48].
6. Actual data from deployment: this is another test run on the
metro trains in Los Angeles. We had a comparison of game-
theoretic scheduler versus an alternative (in this case a uniform
random scheduler augmented with real-time human intelligence)
to check fare evaders. In 21 days of patrols, the game-theoretic
scheduler led to significantly higher numbers of fare evaders cap-
tured than the alternative [48, 49].
7. Domain expert evaluation (internal and external): there have
been of course significant numbers of evaluations done by do-
main experts comparing their own scheduling method with
game-theoretic schedulers and repeatedly the game-theoretic
schedulers have come out ahead. The fact that our software is
now in use for several years at several different important air-
ports, ports, air-traffic, and so on, is an indicator to us that the
domain experts must consider this software of some value.
Cybersecurity: challenges and opportunities
The domain of computer security and privacy provides a rich set
of challenges that requires new innovation and techniques. The
application of game theory to cybersecurity is a new and promising
research field. The potential benefits of applying game theory to
cybersecurity problems are:
1. Game theory captures the adversarial nature of cybersecurity
interactions and provides quantitative and analytical tools that
may help find the optimal defense strategies.
2. Computer implementations of those methods allow examination
of a large number of threat scenarios, which human analyst can
miss due to cognitive limitations and biases.
3. Game theory provides methods for predicting actor’s behavior
in uncertain situations and suggesting probable actions along
with predicted outcomes.
One of the challenges of applying game theory to cybersecurity is
choosing the appropriate game model for a given security problem.
Currently, selecting a game that has relevant features for represent-
ing a cybersecurity scenario is primarily based on intuition. There is
a lack of analysis and empirical data to validate those choices. The
problem is even more aggravated in the domain of privacy, where
there is a fundamental tension between utility of data and privacy
loss from data sharing.
Prior approaches based on simultaneous move games
Much work has focused on modeling cybersecurity problems as a
simultaneous move games. The resulting Nash equilibrium analysis
assume that all players: (i) form beliefs based on an analysis of what
others might do (strategic thinking); (ii) choose the best response
given those beliefs; and (iii) adjust best responses and beliefs until
they are mutually consistent.
We survey some prior work on game theory approaches to
cybersecurity problems. In the next section, we discuss security
game-based approaches to cybersecurity problems. A popular model
for the interaction between a defender and attacker in cybersecurity
is the FlipIt game [50]. This is a continuous time game that models
the fact that any cybersystem will ultimately be compromised and
the defender will have to expend effort to detect and recover. Many
variants of the game have been studied, such as playing FlipIt with
actual human subject experiments [51]. The FlipIt model does not
model the details of a defender–adversary interaction in a cyber-
settings. As such, the model cannot be used directly in any real-
world network to provide guidance about how to use and deploy de-
fense resources at a fine-grained level.
There is lot of work on economics of security that uses game-
theoretic reasoning. For example, Vratonjic et al. [52] explores the
Figure 14. PROTECT evaluation results: predeployment (left) and postdeployment patrols (right).
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economics and privacy aspects of internet service providers (ISPs)
joining the online advertising market, analysis of security invest-
ments via insurance in different settings (weakest link, etc.) [53],
and by considering interdependence and repeated interaction in con-
text of security investments [54]. Recently, deception has been con-
sidered as a defense mechanism in network security. Pawlick et al.
[55] consider a game model of honeypots used for network defense,
where the interaction is modeled as a cheap talk game.
Although most of the existing literature on applications of game
theory to cybersecurity assume that the cost and effectiveness of the
actions of the players are time independent, this is usually not true
in practice. The cost and probability of success of attacks may vary
over time: as much as the attacker’s costs depend on the timing of
the attack, the defender’s costs depend on when to act to success-
fully thwart attacks. Recent work by Johnson et al. [56] has started
to focus on the importance of analyzing the cost and effectiveness of
players’ actions in dynamic settings. They develop and analyze a
continuous-time as well as a discrete-time model of the entire pro-
cess occurring during the lifetime of a vulnerability, starting from its
discovery till it is rendered useless and the on-going mitigation ef-
forts by the defender while the vulnerability can still be exploited.
Similarly, Rasouli et al. [57] has developed an analytical approach
for dynamic cybersecurity problems that capture progressive attacks
to a computer network. Importantly, the model recognizes the fact
that the defender, i.e., the cyber-system supervisor, may not be able
to observe the malicious actions of the adversary in real time. Thus,
the defender must maintain a belief over the state of the computer
network and include network monitoring as part of strategy in add-
ition deterring and mitigating cyber attacks. Lu et al. [58] studies
the active cyber defense in the setting of strategic attackers and/or
strategic defenders. In particular, the paper combines control- and
game-theoretic models under the “homogeneous” assumption that
each compromised computer can attack the same portion of com-
puters. The work first studies two cases: infinite-time horizon opti-
mal control and fast optimal control when the attackers are
nonstrategic. Then they provide the Nash equilibrium strategies in
the case of strategic attackers.
A drawback of simultaneous move games with perfect rational-
ity assumptions is the low predictability power of the model, as has
been pointed out by behavioral economists [42, 43]. The model pla-
ces sufficient computational burden on the players, which results in
the predicted outcomes not being realized in practice. Thus, often in
economics such model are used for high level reasoning and post
hoc understanding of the problem at hand. A day–to-day oper-
ational defense aid requires a detailed model of the problem as well
as decent predictability.
Potential cybersecurity applications of security game
techniques
Our Stackelberg game-based approach provides a complementary
approach to the approaches described in the last subsection. In
Stackelberg games the adversary’s computational burden is lower
and further we account for uncertainty and bounded rational behav-
ior of the adversary. Even with a perfect rationality assumption, the
overall lower complexity of computation of the Stackelberg equilib-
rium (as compared to the Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed
graphs (PPAD) complexity of Nash equilibrium) allows for a de-
tailed model of the underlying domain with scalable algorithms to
compute the equilibrium. There has been some initial work on using
the security games model to address problems in cybersecurity and
privacy. We present three different potential applications here, two
for cybersecurity and one for privacy policy enforcement in
organization.
In [7], the authors study the problem of optimal resource alloca-
tion for packet selection and inspection to detect potential threats in
large computer networks with multiple computers of differing im-
portance. A number of intrusion detection and monitoring systems
are deployed in real-world computer networks with the goal of de-
tecting and preventing attacks. One countermeasure employed is to
conduct “deep packet inspections,” a method that periodically se-
lects a subset of packets in a computer network for analysis, but is
costly in terms of throughput of the network. The security problem
is formulated as a Stackelberg security game between two players:
the attacker (or the intruder) and the defender (the detection sys-
tem), which is played on a computer network modeled as a graph.
The intruder wants to gain control over (or to disable) a valuable
computer in the network by scanning the network, compromising a
more vulnerable system, and/or gaining access to further devices on
the computer network. The actions of the attacker can therefore be
seen as sending malicious packets from a controlled computer
(termed source) to a single or multiple vulnerable computers (termed
targets). The objective of the defender is to prevent the intruder
from succeeding by selecting the packets for inspection, identifying
the attacker, and subsequently thwarting the attack. However,
packet inspections cause unwanted latency and hence the defender
has to decide where and how frequently to inspect network traffic in
order to maximize the probability of a successful malicious packet
detection. The authors provide polynomial time approximation al-
gorithm that benefits from the submodularity property of the discre-
tized zero-sum variant of the game and finds solutions with
bounded error in polynomial time.
In a recent paper [8], the authors study the problem of optimal
number of “honeypots” to be placed in a network. Honeypots are
fake copies of electronic resources (servers, computers, routers, etc.)
that aim to confuse the attacker so that the attacker attacks these
honeypots. Attacks on honeypots also enable the defender to study
the attacker and possibly catch them. The use of honeypots as a de-
ceptive defense mechanism seems promising, but has an associated
cost in setting up the fake electronic assets. Thus, a central question
in this defense mechanism is how many and which types of honey-
pots should be used? The authors use attack graphs to model pos-
sible attack trajectories that the attacker may use. The nodes in
attack graphs are annotated with costs of attacks and benefits of
successful attack, and also the probability of success of attack. In
particular, the number and types of honeypots deployed influence
the probability of success of attacks. The authors model the game as
a Stackelberg security game with the defender choosing the number
and type of honeypots to deploy. The attacker chooses an attack
path with the best utility. The authors provide heuristic algorithm
for the NP-hard problem of finding the optimal attack by converting
the problem to a MDP.
One interesting work, called audit games [9, 10], enhances the
security games model with choice of punishments in order to capture
scenarios of security and privacy policy enforcement in large organ-
izations. Large organizations (such as Google, Facebook, hospitals)
hold enormous amounts of privacy sensitive data. These organiza-
tions mandate their employees to adhere to certain privacy policies
when accessing data. Auditing of access logs is used by organizations
to check for policy violating accesses and then the violators are pun-
ished. Auditing often requires human help to investigate suspicious
cases, and thereby arises the problem of allocating few resources to
the huge number of cases to investigate. Another relevant question
in this domain is how much should the organization punish in case
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of a violation? The audit game models the adversary as an agent
that performs certain tasks (e.g., accesses to private data), and a sub-
set of these tasks are policy violations. The auditor inspects a subset
of the tasks and detects violations from the inspected set. As punish-
ments do affect the behavior of the adversary, it is critical for the
auditor to choose the right level of punishment. As a consequence,
the choice of a punishment level is added to the action space of the
auditor. However, punishment is not free for the auditor; the intu-
ition being that a high punishment level creates a hostile work envir-
onment, leading to lack in productivity of employees which results
in loss for the organization (auditor). As a consequence, the auditor
cannot impose infinite punishment and deter any adversary. The
auditor’s cost for a punishment level is modeled as a loss propor-
tional to the choice of the punishment level. The auditor moves first
by committing to an inspection and punishment strategy, followed
by the best response of the adversary. The resultant Stackelberg
equilibrium optimization turns out to be nonconvex due to the pun-
ishment variable. The authors present efficient algorithms for vari-
ous types of scheduling constraints.
Conclusion
Security is recognized as a world-wide challenge and game theory is
an increasingly important paradigm for reasoning about complex se-
curity resource allocation. We have shown that the general model of
security games is applicable (with appropriate variations) to varied
security scenarios. There are applications deployed in the real world
that have led to a measurable improvement in security. We pre-
sented approaches to address four significant challenges: scalability,
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and field evaluation in security
games. Cybersecurity provides additional challenges that include
limited observability and deception.
In short, we introduced specific techniques to handle each of
these challenges. For scalability, we introduced three approaches: (i)
incremental strategy generation for addressing the problem of large
defender strategy spaces; (ii) double oracle incremental strategy gen-
eration with respect to large defender and attacker strategy spaces;
(iii) compact representation of strategies for the case of mobile re-
sources and moving targets; and (iv) cutting plane (incremental con-
straint generation) for handling multiple boundedly rational
attacker. For handling uncertainty we introduced two approaches:
(i) dimensionality reduction in uncertainty space for addressing a
unification of uncertainties; and (ii) MDP with marginal strategy
representation with respect to dynamic execution uncertainty. In
terms of handling attacker-bounded rationality, we propose differ-
ent behavioral models to capture the attackers’ behaviors and intro-
duce human subject experiments with game simulation to learn such
behavioral models. Finally, for addressing field evaluation in real-
world problems, we discussed two approaches: (i) data from deploy-
ment and (ii) mock attacker team.
While the deployed game-theoretic applications have provided a
promising start, significant amount of research remains to be done.
In particular, cybersecurity provides challenges and opportunities in
modeling multiple agents interacting in the extremely complicated
cyber world. These are large-scale interdisciplinary research chal-
lenges that call upon multiagent researchers to work with re-
searchers in other disciplines, be “on the ground” with domain
experts and examine real-world constraints and challenges that can-
not be abstracted away.
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